Is information a weapon? Our electromagnetic warfare expert debates
12 Aug 24
Technical and Strategic Services OBUElectronic Warfare
BY Andy Rogerson
“Information is all, is it not?” – Ernst Stavro Blofeld
Can information create operational effect? How do we view traditional operations and how can we leverage the power of information and data on the contemporary battlefield? How are operations changing with the advent of ‘information superiority’? Andy Rogerson, our Electromagnetic Warfare Training and Consultancy Expert, discusses in today's blog.
Traditional doctrine attempts to neatly break military operations into convenient ‘classical’ pillars (diagram 1).
Diagram 1
Whilst this is not a doctrinally complete or pure representation, it aims to capture the classical view of operational planning. Within that model, a task is set, a hierarchy of prioritised aims are established with each stakeholder contributing to the mission within clear and defined doctrinal constraints. This has historically been true at a systems level with capabilities fielding individual targeting systems, separate electromagnetic warfare (EW) systems etc.
Diagram 2
Diagram 2 is intended to highlight the doctrinal innovations which aim to introduce greater synergistic efficiencies by breaking down traditional silos. Again, at a systems level, fusion technologies have sought to combine information for holistic gain. This image is not a completely accurate representation and not aimed at dismissing other contributing operational requirements, for example command and control or spectrum management.
It could be argued that the effectiveness of such initiatives is measured against a metric of classical warfare, with elements such as electromagnetic spectrum operations (EMSO) developed to expedite the Observe, Orient, Decide and Act (OODA) loop, whilst concurrently providing a mechanism to minimise electronic fratricide.
The nature of war has evolved with the emergence of a new ‘style’ of war utilising information as a weapon. Nomenclature such as the ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’ has been leveraged to identify this new employment of information and information control as a weapon. The effects of information control, and the ability to shape perceptions and hence responses can be argued to have the ability to be as ‘destructive’ as any kinetic effect.
Modern artificially intelligence-aided processing permits levels of deepfake media convincing enough to cause levels of destabilisation equivalent to kinetic weapons but without the levels of evidenced attribution. Such intelligence ‘weapons’ may have been used to kickstart so-called ‘colour revolutions’.
There is evidence that our potential adversaries have undertaken significant debate as to whether information control and those effects amount to an act of war. Whilst individual stakeholders differ slightly in perspective, it is clear that as an operational tool, these so called ‘grey zone’ effects are considered war by our adversaries and acts short of war by us. Or at least, if the West does consider them acts of war, it has not chosen to respond in kind. This disconnect is an important one to understand if we are to react to it in future conflict.
We presently use the term ‘information operations’ in a very specific way. However, control of the information space in general and extreme broadening of the information domain is likely to be another contribution to future planning and operational reaction to achieve our own effects and end-states.
Perhaps the issue is how to include any future ‘information actions’ within our planning and execution of operations. Information will mean more than current info ops or psychological operations. I suspect future information actions will require the ability to break down doctrinal silos enabling information to flow to point of need much more rapidly than current processes permit.
If legacy doctrine, or even aspirations like EMSO are tuned to classical warfare, perhaps this new paradigm requires a doctrinal rethought to align to emerging ‘non-classical’ war?
The nature of war has evolved with the emergence of a new ‘style’ of war utilising information as a weapon.
EW is an excellent example of how current silos may need breaking down to permit a new paradigm of information dominance. Capabilities within the electromagnetic battlespace now have the ability to change dynamically to threats. Responsive algorithms within threat systems enable them to change their parameters if they perceive that they may have been exposed.
In turn this creates a temporal delta between western signals intelligence ISR systems being able to provide source intelligence mission data, processing to categorise those parametrics and then the cascade of resulting mission data to operational sensors to make sense of their surroundings.
This is not a future requirement but is here now. Legacy silo models are unlikely to maintain parity with the dynamic battlespace.
The emergence of modern sensors also confuses the legacy picture. The Global Combat Air Platform (GCAP) will be fielded with integrated sensing and non-kinetic effects (ISANKE). I expect this sensor to no longer comply with legacy distinctions between what is provided solely by ISR signals intelligence or by EW electronic surveillance, but to successfully converge those two disciplines and others. Such a vision is in part corroborated by Leonardo: “It [ISANKE] transitions from the traditional combat air model of individual airborne sensors to instead providing a fully integrated sensing, fusion and self-protection capability that draws on a spider’s web of sensing and effecting nodes across each platform.”
Information requirements to and mission outputs from may similarly need to be agnostic of former doctrinal silos.
Future capabilities like those within GCAP are likely to be fielded across all domains of air, land, sea and space, each also with capabilities in the additional electromagnetic domain. Solutions will need to be found for how to break down these traditional specialisations when the capability does not recognise them.
Output data volumes are likely to require significant triage to facilitate any decision cycles in an operationally relevant timescale. Human-centric PED (processing-exploitation-dissemination) cycles are likely to be a temporal handicap, artificially reducing the speed of our OODA loop as a function of imposed doctrine rather than altering conceptual thought in line with a modern converged-doctrine battlespace.
Thinking within current silos such as ‘that’s ISR’, ‘that’s EW’, ‘that’s cyber’ are likely to hinder the effectiveness of future systems. Artificial intelligence systems are likely to be required to form part of the enterprise structure to provide data triage, real-time threat surveillance, real-time PED and management of real-time mission data to facilitate decision-making. I have no doubt that personnel will remain focused on dedicated skill sets for some time, but perhaps the overall architecture requires modern flexibility to permit information liquidity?
What do you think? We can debate this and more in our Fundamentals of Electromagnetic Warfare training, with our next course taking place 11 – 15 November 2024.
The course is suitable for military and civilian personnel with role in the design, development, acquisition or operation of EW capabilities, plus those with an active interest in the topic. Get in touch at [email protected] to book.
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